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  To harp on a little about the Federal Government and post-event thing, consider that if you are a Patriot, then your loyalty is to the United States of America and the Constitution. That is the Federal government, so long as it remains true to the Constitution, the rule of law and liberty of the Citizens: unless you are an anarchist or extremist and are simply all about your own ‘freedom’.

  When you watch zombie movies, the general assumption is that there will be no more authority and the characters are operating in an apocalyptic scenario. Consider that it will not likely be so cut and dried. The television series Jericho (you can find it on Netflix) is an excellent show, very well informed, and thus not so surprisingly it disappeared after a rushed finale mid-season two. It is a testament to the state of modern America that it is easy to believe in a conspiracy to remove this TV show because it got ‘too close to the truth’.

  It is easy to wonder about our liberty in today’s political climate. James Wesley, Rawles’ excellent book ‘Patriots’ also touched on some of these issues of a more complicated situation post event. Some of the themes touched on by these two media:

   Serious collapse events affecting the whole of the country.

   Community defense and warfare between communities based on scarce resources.

   Continuing existence or emergence of a form of centralized government.

   Peacekeeping/occupation forces.

   Federal troops operating on home ground.

   Legitimacy of government issues: divergence from the constitution and the values of the United States of America.

   Troops/agencies/companies taking control in a ‘fascist’ like way.

   Martial Law.

   Creation of ‘insurgents’ (Resistance Fighters), in a very close to the mark observation of how insurgents are created by occupying forces: Jericho deputy sheriff: “Either we start shooting or they will take our houses.” Also stated: “This is not a country, it’s a company.”

  These media contain a lot of food for thought for preppers envisaging a post-event situation.

  A Little More on Threat

  The reason for this following section is to outline the kind of threats faced in combat theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan simply to make you aware of them, in case similar threats emerge in the Continental United States as a result of a long term collapse situation.

  Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are not covered extensively in this manual, but there is definitely the capability to make them in the US and it may well be that this kind of threat emerges in a post-event scenario.

  Therefore, to introduce this topic, let us look at some of the main threats that may be faced in an insurgent type hostile environment. The threat outlined is generalized to asymmetric warfare and taken from the historical threat on OIF/OEF in Iraq and Afghanistan. The following is an account of general threats:

   Improvised Explosive Device (IED). IEDs come in various sizes and the effectiveness of an IED depends on large part as a function of size and placement, as well as accurate targeting. IEDs can be connected in a ‘daisy chain’ and usually placed to match the anticipated spacing of vehicles in convoys, to cause maximum damage. IEDs can be initiated in a number of ways:

  o Command Wire (CWIED). A physical connection between the initiation point (Firing point (FP)) and the CWIED itself (Contact Point)); the need for this connection can aid in detection of the device and the FP.

  o Remote Control (RCIED). The RCIED is detonated remotely using any one of multiple options. It can be anything from a cell phone to a garage door opener. This increases the enemy’s options for placement and FP, without the need to be physically connected to the device. This can make it harder to detect the device.

   Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). Simply put, the IED is inside the vehicle. This type of IED will usually be remotely detonated, or can be on a timer (exception: see SVBIED, below). The VBIED allows for mobility and placement of large IEDs. However, they can be detected: a simple example can be a car that is packed with Home Made Explosives (HME) and therefore the suspension is weighed down, making the vehicle suspicious as it sits parked at its placement point.

   Off-Route Mine or Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP): A targeted IED capable of defeating armor:

  o The EFP is very effective and can defeat many types of armor. The EFP is effectively an ‘off route mine’, using the ‘Miznay-Chardin’ effect to create a molten slug or spray of metal that will pierce armor, causing damaging effects inside the vehicle as it passes through. The Miznay-Chardin effect places explosives behind a metal cone or dish: on detonation, the cone inverts and forms into a slug of metal. This is a similar effect to that used by a standard RPG (the ‘Monroe Effect’), with the exception that an RPG detonates on contact with a vehicle, whereas the EFP goes off several feet away by the side of the road. Whereas an RPG can have its lethal effect dissipated by the use of a mesh cage around vehicle and bunkers, to disrupt the molten jet effect of its warhead, the EFP is harder to defeat and will penetrate through armored vehicles, although it will be disrupted as it passes through parts of an armored vehicle.. It is not usually defeated by the use of a cage; an RPG is a contact warhead whereas the EFP is a standoff penetrator.

  o The effect of an EFP can be devastating but usually limited in scope. An EFP will pass through armor, and there have been multiple circumstances of EFPs causing traumatic lower limb amputation of personnel in the driver and front passenger seats of vehicles, but personnel in other compartments being left unscathed.

  o EFPs have historically been initiated with the use of an Infra-Red (IR) beam that crosses the road; effectively a tripwire. When the vehicle breaks the beam the EFP detonates. The impact point on the vehicle depends on the aspect the EFP is placed at and also the distance between the IR trigger and the device itself. How the insurgent sets this up will determine placement on the vehicle. Multiple EFPs can be tied to one IR trigger to hit one vehicle in numerous places, or be spaced in the hope of the ‘daisy chain’ hitting multiple vehicles in convoy. The EFP has to be armed - i.e. the IR trigger switched on – otherwise the device would initiate on the next vehicle along the route, which may be a civilian vehicle or otherwise not the target. Thus, the EFP is armed remotely, turning on the IR trigger. This also has the advantage of allowing arming while outside of any ECM ‘bubble’ that would defeat the remote arming device. This makes the EFP to an extent a remote controlled device, but also a Victim Operated (VOIED) device. There are ways of mitigating risk: see Mitigation, below.

   Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device (VOIED). This type of IED is detonated by the actions of the victim. In order to be effective the IED will usually target a location that is known to be used by coalition forces (see vulnerable points, below). VOIEDs can be anti-personnel or anti-vehicle. The type of location targeted would usually be somewhere that locals could avoid, but that forms a channel for military personnel or vehicles. These devices, or the corresponding safe routes, may also be marked, often in unusual ways, similar to the way that mines are often marked in the Balkans i.e. piles of rocks, sticks, cloth tied to markers etc.

   Sniper. More likely to be a ‘sharpshooter’ rather than a trained sniper; defined by accurate rifle fire.

   Small Arms Fire (SAF).

   Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG).

   Complex Attack/Ambush. An attack utilizing any or all of the individual threats listed.

   Close Quarter Assassination (CQA). May be planned or opportunistic; a threat at leader engagements or while otherwise interacting with local population.

   Kidnap/Capture. As per CQA; Isolated Personnel (IP) at risk of capture or a deliberate kidnap attempt. A concern if personnel are isolated following contact.

   Indirect Fire (IDF) – Rocket: 107/120mm rocket attack. Not a key threat in the scope of this document, more concerned with FOB/static location security, but could be employed by insurgents.

&n
bsp;  Indirect Fire (IDF) – Mortar or artillery. As per rocket, may also be utilized as part of a complex attack. Accuracy varies widely. Personnel noticing that they are being ‘bracketed’ by IDF should be concerned that an observer is targeting them with accurate, observed and corrected IDF.

   Suicide Vehicle Borne IED (SVBIED). The employment of Rules of Engagement (ROE) & Escalation of Force (EOF) measures is necessary in order to mitigate this threat. We hope that we do not face this kind of threat post-event in the Continental United States.

   Suicide Bomber. A particular threat to dismounted personnel; additionally, the use of screening procedures is required at any type of organized meeting. Again, we hope that we do not face this kind of threat post-event in the Continental United States.

   In addition to this, and last but not least, is the generalized threat from attacks against protected locations from vehicle mounted and dismounted personnel determined to assault and overrun that location, for whatever spectrum of motives.

  The Mission

  The mission is to become tactically proficient and prepared in order to best ensure the safety and survivability of your group, team or family in a post-event scenario.

  Intent: Defend to survive and thrive.

  Purpose: Add tactical skills to a preppers skill-set so that in a worst case scenario of a physical attack the group or family will be able to deal with it, survive and continue to concentrate on building a quality of life post-event; to not have to live in fear of violent or predatory elements.

  Family/Group/Team

  The premise of this manual is that your group will be based around your family or small group of preppers. This will include persons of all ages (babies, kids, teens and the elderly), physical ability, training and perhaps physical disability and illness. This is not a manual for ‘Delta Force’; which is what makes consideration of the situation inherently terrifying. We have to protect the weaker and more vulnerable members of our group and it may come to a situation where hostile fire is coming down onto your group and your kids. Shocking and terrifying. Therefore, we must do all we can to mitigate the threat.

  This can be achieved by training, preparation, situational awareness, experience and above all AVOIDANCE. It is very important that those in the group that are physically capable do all they can to increase their ability to protect the weaker members. This means getting physically fit and strong, training in weapons and tactics, and being ready and maintaining that state of readiness.

  Sexism has no place here: male and female alike need to be trained and ready. It may be that in some group individual’s fall into common gender roles, and this is fine: a mother will be primarily concerned for the supervision and protection of the kids. The father will be as well, but he may be operating as the outer protection while the mother stays in close with the kids, but she must be able to defend them like a lioness if they are threatened; not only having the intent and will to do so, but having the capability to effectively do so as well.

  As you progress through this manual, you will note that it moves on from a specific discussion about family or small groups with children and the elderly in tow, to more complex skills and techniques. Therein is a problem in making the connection between the ‘husband/wife/family defense and survival scenario’ and the well-developed tactics and procedures that we then progress to.

  These more advanced tactics imply a well-trained, disciplined, fit, motivated and equipped team. Creating such a team is certainly a possibility but either implies the ability to train in advance or to conduct training post-event, which may or may not be possible depending on the situation. There is definitely an advantage in numbers, by which is meant numbers of suitable candidates rather than simple numbers. Therein lays another problem: getting buy-in from suitable neighbors and suburban/town folk who perhaps have no idea or desire to consider the implications of an event.

  So, best safety practice for your family implies getting with other families and personnel, a suitable number of people that would allow you to develop a tactical team that goes above and beyond simple protection of your family. You may or may not be able to achieve that, hence the two levels described in this book, the one being simple tactical defense for a small unit such as family group, the other being more advanced techniques when you can create a tactical group that can operate above and beyond the necessity for close protection of the group.

  To conjecture for a moment on post-event scenarios, it’s a big problem, a central problem. If a mob of 50-100-200 rampaging crazies turn up with ‘heavy weapons’ in ‘technicals’ they are just going to roll-up any number of brave but isolated families. In the summer of 2011 there was a mob on the loose in London, United Kingdom. Politicians called for the British Army to be called out, but there are not enough Army Reserves in the UK to defend any serious area against large numbers of extremist groups. How would the National Guard do in the USA?

  It is most desirable and effective to have a community response; at least in the US there is the ability to have weapons, unlike in the UK where the population is defenseless and reliant on the military.

  We often talk about a collapse taking us back to the middle- or dark-ages: In another post collapse situation, that of Britain once the Romans withdrew and took law and order with them, Alfred the Great saw this play out as the Vikings rampaged and ravaged ancient Britain, reducing it to a devastated wilderness. He made people build fortified towns, burghs, and he made them live in them. He ordered that the population provide an armed man for each five yards of the town wall. The Saxons were able to conquer Britain and then, later, survive the Vikings because they had a martial tradition based on the family, the extended family, the ‘hundred’ etc. War bands could be quickly assembled for attack or defense.

  It is true that there are a huge amount of firearms in America. There are a lot of people who shoot and hunt, and those that have weapons for security and self-defense. That is not even to mention those that have them for criminal purposes. Because the bad guys have guns, it is necessary for the good guys to have them also, which is why any attempt to take away or diminish the right to bear arms will only hurt the law-abiding good guys; the genie of weapons proliferation is out of the bag and will not be stuffed back in.

  There is also a strong tradition of bearing arms in America for the defense of citizen liberty, and when the government is unable to protect its citizens in a post-event scenario it is essential that those citizens are armed and equipped to do so themselves. Without getting into a spin off discussion about weapons ownership, Second Amendment rights, Federal and State government; the point being headed to is that essentially there is a lot of weapon ownership but not necessarily tactical ability to go along with that.

  Think of the hunter stereotype, someone who that has weapons and can sit in a hide or shoot from a truck, but is hugely overweight and unfit, unable to maneuver his body tactically? How about the homeowner who owns guns and desires to protect his family, but has no real practice or training, beyond a few rounds fired at his local indoor range?

  The destruction of society and our youth through social breakdown, violent media and video games has conditioned society to a higher threshold of violence; we live in a violent society where role models and exposure to media has lowered the threshold of the willingness to act violently. This includes our law enforcement, both as a result of the increased threat they face but also the same exposure to media portraying justification of violence from pseudo law-enforcement role models.

  The tradition of the Militia and citizen soldiers, many of whom are well intentioned but with others that have political and extremist motives, is something that has value if such forces can be trained among law-abiding citizens and become the basis for civil defense groups post-event. If the National Guard isn't going to cut it in a crisis, then perhaps we need to consider supplementary forces.

  To use Britain as an example again: Lord Roberts VC (of Kandahar fame), dissatisfied with Britain's def
enses, set up the National Rifle Association (NRA) to teach citizens to shoot. Baden Powell having seen the lamentable state of Britain's city-bred citizen Army's fieldcraft in South Africa set up the Scout movement. In the 1950s virtually every man in Britain was ‘trained’ and could use arms. Even school cadets were proficient on the .303 rifle and the Bren Gun. Now hardly any adult male has handled a weapon; it is amazing how alarmed civilians get when they see a gun.

  In contrast, the US public is ‘gun toting’ by comparison, although there are a huge amount of people out there who are alarmed by weapons in the same way as in the UK. Given the threat of weapons in the hands of the bad guys, they need to ‘get over it’ and get trained and equipped if they expect to be able to survive the assault of these same bad guys post-event.

  It is very important to stay on the right side of the law; there is definitely a scope for small groups and Militia (being careful with that name due to some of the negative connotations associated with it nowadays) or alternatively civil and neighborhood defense groups, to be trained, equipped and ready for small team tactics. It can even be great fun and satisfying to conduct pre-event valuable and demanding training, promoting bonding and teamwork. Perhaps even to conduct fundamental ‘Phase 1’ training for groups of like-minded friends, from local streets and neighborhoods?

  Think of these two images: The sad columns of tractors and trailers in the Former Yugoslavia; the man driving the tractor, the family in the trailer: Road block, the men taken away and shot. Then, fast forward to Libya and the utterly hopeless tactical standard of the militias. An interesting scenario in that NATO air power stopped the use of tanks, artillery and heavy weapons by government forces and the rebels were able to take out the rifle men and RPG men with longer-range 57mm AA cannon mounted on ‘technicals’, negating their tactical incompetence. Sad to say, as will become apparent later in this book, it's virtually impossible to defend a house by yourself against any sort of number of determined adversaries equipped with assault weapons.